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Abstract
In this paper we give a clear-cut explanation to the sluggish wage
adjustments which are commonly experienced also in face of involun-
tary unemployment. We prove that unemployment may be the physi-
ological outcome of rational decisions by competing workers who may
find it optimal to ask higher wages than the full-employment ones.
The key element driving the result is the slope (or elasticity) of la-
bor demand schedule: in case of rigid labor demand, in fact, workers’
wage requests are kept high because of reduced unemployment oppor-
tunity costs. This contrasts with other approaches to the analysis of
unemployment, where only the level of labor demand is considered.
Impatience of working and effort required by the job are also showed
to influence the degree of wage stickiness.
Keywords : Sticky wages, involuntary unemployment, labor demand elas-
ticity, game theory
JEL classification : C72, E24, J23, J64
1 Introduction
Sticky wage theories are currently the most popular approach to the analysis
of unemployment. If on one hand such models appear as sophisticated and
formally elegant explanations of unemployment, on the other hand they often
rest on rather ad hoc and implausible assumptions. The goal we pursue in
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this paper, therefore, is to provide a simple and general explanation to wage
stickiness and persistent involuntary unemployment1.
The benchmark for the sticky wage models is represented by the Classical
marginalist theory of unemployment, which holds the Walrasian presumption
that wage adjustments always settle imbalances between demand and supply
of labor. In this view unemployment is largely voluntary and therefore needs
not to be explained (and cared of)2. However, in reality the observed wage
adjustments are not as prompt as they are supposed to be by Classical the-
ory, and unemployment is acknowledged to be an involuntary and persistent
phenomenon.
In the view of sticky wage theories the labor market is still intrinsically
Walrasian and prone to attain the balance of demand and supply, but wages
are prevented from adjusting to full employment levels by frictions of one sort
or another. These theories can be therefore classified according to how they
explain the nature of the rigidities causing market-clearing to fail. Since the
literature is very huge, in what follows we just recall the principal strands of
research that make it up.
Among the principal examples we find contracting models (e.g. Taylor,
1979) and search models (e.g. Diamond, 1982). Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches do not provide true economic explanations and basically border on
tautology, the former stating that wages do not adjust because predeter-
mined job contracts prevent them from adjusting, the latter claiming that
individuals cannot find a job because the search for a firm willing to hire is
costly. Also, even though legal commitments and search costs may partly
explain the presence of persistent equilibrium unemployment, these frictions
could hardly be satisfactory explanations of its cyclical variations. In fact,
if frictions cause a given level of unemployment, then in principle their vari-
ations should cause variations in unemployment. But cyclical movements
in frictions preceding those of the unemployment rate are hardly observed.
The explanation to unemployment variations should be therefore sought else-
where.
Another popular way to explain sluggish wage adjustments is represented
by the efficiency-wage theories (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), which prove
that firms, in presence of imperfect monitoring, might find it convenient to
1We shall be loose on whether wages are nominal or real since this is not crucial for
the analysis.
2Classical attitude toward the unemployed is not dissimilar from that held by Queen
Marie Antoinette toward the Parisians asking for bread during the French Revolution.
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pay higher wages than the full-employment ones in order to prevent work-
ers from shirking. Efficiency-wage models provide economic explanations to
sticky wages but, perhaps, for the wrong reasons. Crucial to the analysis, in
fact, is the naive, unproven and unnecessary assumption that workers shirk
in full-employment conditions. Moreover, real firms need not to pay “high”
wages to reduce the temptation of shirking because they dispose of many
other incentives such as wages linked to individual productivity. Efficiency-
wage theories can be also questioned as far as their predictions are concerned.
As a matter of fact, these models hold that wages are fully flexible outside
equilibrium, but fixed at equilibrium. Hence, they do not explain why wages
are sticky even in face of excess of labor supply, but tell why equilibrium
wages must always lie above the market-clearing level and why full employ-
ment can never be attained, regardless of labor demand. Clearly, these pre-
dictions are unnecessary. Last but not least, there is one more aspect that
to our knowledge has so far never been recognized. In these models equi-
librium unemployment occurs at the intersection between labor demand and
the no-shirking condition curve. The no-shirking condition curve represents
the wage to be paid in order to induce a given amount of employees to exert
effort, that is to induce them to provide their labor, and basically matches
a canonical forward-leaning labor supply schedule. In fact, both functions
are mappings from offered wages to labor supply. Thus, the efficiency-wage
approach, apart from the formal complicacies and the rather ad hoc assump-
tions that characterize it, is essentially identical to the Classical theory3.
As a conclusion to our brief review, we point out that while maintaining
the involuntary nature of unemployment, the sticky wage approach reduces
it to a peculiar equilibrium of the labor market. This is the starting point
of the present paper, where we are going to assume an alternative perspec-
tive. In our opinion, in fact, what can be observed in labor markets at the
usual time frequencies is neither an equilibrium nor a permanent situation of
disequilibrium, but a slow process of adaptation possibly converging to some
equilibrium. Consequently, wages should be regarded neither as fixed nor
as fully flexible. The correct research question, therefore, is not to explain
why a smooth adjustment process eventually sticks into a situation charac-
3Efficiency wages supporters may point out that at equilibrium unemployment is in-
voluntary. However, in our opinion semantic tricks are being played here. In fact, if the
unemployed were hired at an infinitesimally lower wage, they would shirk, and shirking
workers are ones who do not want to supply labor. Therefore, they are not different from
voluntarily unemployed workers (aside from an economically small epsilon, of course!).
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terized by involuntary unemployment, but is to explain why this process can
be more or less sluggish. To understand that the difference is substantial, let
us consider Fig. (1), where two different labor markets are depicted: both
share the same rigid labor supply S, same current wages w0 and same lev-
els of unemployment, but one is characterized by a steep (inelastic) labor
demand D, while the other is characterized by an elastic labor demand D′.
Full-employment wages are respectively equal to 0 and 12. Paradoxically, ac-
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Figure 1: Two alternative labor markets: with rigid (D) and elastic demand (D′)
cording to economic theory the two scenarios are identical. On the one hand
Classical theory holds that both markets will quickly converge to full employ-
ment, even though in the case of inelastic demand workers are supposed to
accept a null wage, on the other hand the sticky wage approach predicts that
unemployment will persist in both scenarios, although in the case of elas-
tic demand the wage reduction necessary to reach full employment is small.
But simply calling upon common sense, we believe that anyone would agree
on the fact that a relatively prompt adjustment to full employment is more
likely to occur in the elastic labor demand case, while more resistance should
be experienced in the rigid demand case. The essence of this paper is exactly
to prove that to rational workers the two scenarios are indeed different.
To formalize the above intuition, we set up a stylized game-theoretic
framework where rational unemployed workers compete for a job by bidding
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wage offers. While they are ready to work at any wage level (including
full-employment wages), they would also like to earn as much as possible.
But because of competition, high bids may drive them out of the market.
Workers, therefore, face a trade-off between the certainty of finding a job
at a low wage and the risk of experiencing a long spell of unemployment
caused by too exorbitant wage bids. In solving this dilemma, workers may
actually find it optimal asking at first high wages, and reducing their requests
only later if necessary. Thus, sluggish wage adjustments and the consequent
persistent unemployment may be the natural outcome of competition among
rational workers and not of macroeconomic disequilibrium or microeconomic
frictions impeding firms from hiring. We point out that, in spite of marked
formal differences, our approach might be seen as an instance of competitive
search modeling (Moen, 1997; Shimer, 1996), where wage posting by firms is
combined to directed job search by workers (see Rogerson et al., 2005).
The key factor driving our result is the slope (or the elasticity) of labor
demand schedule, which normally is not given much consideration in the
analysis of unemployment: when demand is inelastic sticky wages and per-
sistent unemployment are more likely to show up, while full employment can
be restored more easily when labor demand is elastic. This finding contrasts
with other approaches, such as Keynesian economics, where the level of labor
demand is regarded as the cause of unemployment. Moreover, we find that
other two factors of secondary importance can also play a role in increasing
wage stickiness: the degree of patience characterizing the workers and the
effort required by the job. In particular, we can deduce that ill-paid and hard
jobs are generally made only by the poor.
Besides the traditional dichotomy of voluntary and involuntary unem-
ployment, we propose here a third concept that we take the liberty to call
“rational unemployment”. It is not involuntary as no rigidity prevents work-
ers from immediately finding a job by bidding the full-employment wage,
and it is not even voluntary in the Classical sense because workers are in
principle available to work at any wage level. In a sense, we can think of
rational unemployment as a lost bet.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
describe the model and discuss the main result. In the third section we extend
the model by introducing the working effort and analyze the relationship
between impatience of working and the effort required by the job. Section 4
concludes.
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2 The model
Consider a labor market made up of one monopsonistic firm and two compet-
ing unemployed workers4. At the current wage w0 the firm has no vacancies,
but it is willing to open one vacancy at wage rate w1 and two vacancies at
w2, with w0 > w1 > w2. The workers are available to accept any wage level
in order to get the job. As a consequence, w2 is the full-employment wage
rate. The workers compete for the two jobs bidding a wage offer. The game
lasts two periods and everything is common knowledge. Even though con-
sidering an infinitely repeated game would seem more appropriate to explain
persistent unemployment, we stick to the simpler two-stage game because
results qualitatively coincide.
To determine the payoff functions we have to consider three possible cases.
In the first case both workers bid w2 and the firm opens two vacancies, so
that they get the job at the proposed wage. This is the Classical solution,
with wages immediately set at full employment level.
In the second case one worker bids w1 and the other bids w2. Hence, the
one bidding less immediately gets the job at wage w2, while the other stays
unemployed since she is asking for a job at a higher wage. In the second
period the firm’s labor demand is decreased by one at any wage rate as one
worker has been employed in the previous period. Consequently, at w1 the
firm has no more vacancies, and has only one at w2. Thus, the unemployed is
forced to bid w2 in order to work. We suppose that the second-period wage
is discounted by a non-negative factor β ≤ 1. In this case unemployment
is persistent as it takes two periods to disappear, even though the wage at
which both workers find the job is the full-employment one w2.
In the last case both workers bid w1 and the firm opens one vacancy only.
We assume that each worker has 1/2 of probability to get the job at w1. Who
stays unemployed will face in the second period a reduced labor demand as
above explained. However, the firm has one more worker employed at wage
w1, and it is likely that she is not willing anymore to open another vacancy
at wage w2. So, in order to keep the firm’s behavior consistent we should
assume that the worker can get the job only at the wage w3 ≤ w25. Thus,
4From a formal viewpoint, our model resembles that of Montgomery (1991), where two
firms post wages and two workers apply for a job. However, similarities stop here.
5Notice that this assumption is the most unfavorable to our argument, as we will show
in a while.
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assuming risk-neutrality each worker has an overall expected payoff of
pii(w1, w1) =
2w1 + βw3
2
. (1)
Also in this case unemployment is persistent. In addition, wages adjust
slowly, from w0 to w1, and then from w1 to w3.
The game is summarized by the payoff matrix given in Fig. (2). As we
w1 w2
w1
2w1+βw3
2
, 2w1+βw3
2
βw2, 2w2
w2 2w2, βw2 2w2, 2w2
Figure 2: Workers’ payoffs
can see, the Classical outcome ’(w2, w2)’ is indeed a Nash Equilibrium of the
game. However, the crucial point is to assess its plausibility.
For the time being, let’s consider the extreme case of w3 ≤ 0: if both
workers choose the pair of strategies ’(w1, w1)’, then in the second period the
unemployed cannot find a job at a positive wage. Though, the pair ’(w1, w1)’
can still be an equilibrium if w1 ≥ 2w2, that is when the labor demand
schedule is very steep, or inelastic. If this is the case this solution Pareto-
dominates the Classical equilibrium and proposes itself as the focal point of
the game. Its meaning is straightforward: when the wage reduction necessary
to immediately find a job is excessive, the workers find optimal to risk a longer
spell of unemployment in order to gain a high wage or, better, not to end
up with too low a wage. Thus, when labor demand is rather inelastic wages
adjust slowly and unemployment takes time to disappear simply as a result
of rational choices, whereby our definition of rational unemployment.
More in general, we can define the Rational Unemployment Region (RUR)
as all the possible combinations of values for the vector (β, w1, w2, w3) such
that rational unemployment and sluggish wages show up as equilibrium phe-
nomena. The RUR is given by the set of non-negative values satisfying
2w1 + βw3
2
> 2w2,
that is
w1 − w2 > w2 − β
2
w3. (2)
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Inequality (2) helps to show the importance of the elasticity of labor demand:
the larger the difference between w1 and w2 or the smaller the one between
w2 and w3, the higher the possibility of having persistent unemployment.
The RUR also shows how the degree of “patience” β influences wage
stickiness and unemployment. If the workers are patient (β close to 1), as in
the case of individuals endowed with enough savings to live without work-
ing, or supported by their family, or again benefiting from unemployment
subsidies, then the RHS of inequality (2) is smaller and the pair of strategies
’(w1, w1)’ is more likely to be an equilibrium. The interpretation of the role
of β is clearcut: if workers are not compelled to bid down the wage by some
contingency (i.e. if their budget constraint is not binding), they actually
could find it optimal trying to get the job at a high wage (w1) at the risk of
remaining unemployed for a longer period. Conversely, when β is close to 0,
that is when unemployed workers are impatient to find a job because their
budget constraint binds, the Classical outcome ’(w2, w2)’ is more likely to be
the unique solution of the game. This finding is consistent with the fact that
poor people are more inclined to accept low wages.
In the next section we extend the model to include the effort of working,
and we will see that also in this case our framework forecasts reasonable
results.
3 Effort and unemployment
In this section the working effort is introduced. We will see that when the
effort required by the work is higher, the workers are more reluctant to bid
down the wage (the strategies ’(w1, w1)’ become the Pareto-dominant equi-
librium). In addition, we find a convincing relationship between effort and
patience.
Now, working costs an effort e to workers, whereby their payoff from
working reduces to w− e. The new payoff matrix is shown in Fig. (3), where
we set w3 = w2 to make algebra simpler.
Again, the RUR is given by
2w1 + βw2 − (2 + β)e
2
> 2(w2 − e),
that is
2w1 − 4w2 > βe− 2e− βw2. (3)
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w1 w2
w1
2w1+βw2−(2+β)e
2
, 2w1+βw2−(2+β)e
2
β(w2 − e), 2(w2 − e)
w2 2(w2 − e), β(w2 − e) 2(w2 − e), 2(w2 − e)
Figure 3: Workers’ payoffs
For given w1 and w2, the occurrence of rational unemployment depends on β
and e. Since the derivative of RHS of inequality (3) with respect to both β
and e is negative, these two parameters increase the likelihood of persistent
unemployment. In fact, effort reduces the value of a job and therefore the
incentive to work, and it is logical for workers to ask for higher wages. Said
in passing, we frankly believe that the way effort works in our model is
much more realistic than how is supposed to work in efficiency wage theories.
However, it is even more interesting to study how the parameters β and e
interact with each other, as shown below.
First, suppose that e ≤ w2 (otherwise in the second period there is no
incentive whatsoever to work). For a given e, we define βˆ(e) as the maximum
degree of patience that workers may possess such that the LHS in (3) is not
greater than the RHS, making the Classical solution ’(w2, w2)’ the unique
equilibrium of the game. So, βˆ(e) is such that
2w1 − 4w2 = βˆe− 2e− βˆw2,
from which
βˆ(e) =
a− 2e
w2 − e, (4)
where we have set 2w1 − 4w2 = −a.
If the degree of patience characterizing the workers is lower than the
threshold βˆ(e), then the full-employment equilibrium is the only outcome,
while if it exceeds βˆ(e) then the sticky wages/persistent unemployment so-
lution ’(w1, w1)’ becomes the focal point of the game. Eq. (4) shows that
threshold βˆ(e) is clearly decreasing in e, which implies that higher effort
levels are compatible with the Classical outcome only for smaller degree of
patience. In other words, more patient workers (say ’richer’ workers) can
only tolerate low effort levels before the focal point of the game becomes
’(w1, w1)’. On the contrary, less patient workers (say ’poorer’ workers) can
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still have an incentive to bid a low wage w2 even though the job becomes
harder. This finding is consistent with the fact that in general hard and
ill-paid jobs are performed by the poor.
4 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to give a clearcut rationale for the sluggish wage
adjustment which is commonly experienced also in face of involuntary unem-
ployment. We have proved that unemployment needs not to be necessarily
the fruit of macroeconomic disequilibrium or frictions impeding the right
working of labor market mechanisms, but that it may simply be the natu-
ral consequence of workers’ rational decisions. We did so by working with
a theoretical apparatus characterized by extreme formal simplicity, which is
always a value added when explaining real phenomena.
We assumed that unemployed workers compete for a job by bidding wage
offers. While they are ready to work at any wage rate, at the same time
they would like to earn as much as possible. Workers, therefore, face a
trade-off between the certainty of finding a job at a low wage and the risk
of experiencing a long spell of unemployment caused by too exorbitant wage
bids. We have showed that workers may indeed be reluctant to immediately
bid low wage offers and want to assume the risk of remaining unemployed for
a long period. We have therefore referred to this kind of unemployment as
rational unemployment to stress that it is neither voluntary in the Classical
sense, because workers do want to have a job, nor involuntary, as no rigidity
prevents workers from bidding the full-employment wage level.
The major factor driving the result is the elasticity of labor demand,
which is in general neglected in the analysis of unemployment. Labor de-
mand rigidity, in fact, lowers the convenience of finding a job since it requires
the bidding of a low wage level. As a consequence, it decreases the oppor-
tunity cost of being unemployed. This marks a sharp difference with other
approaches, where only the level of labor demand is considered.
The model also predicts that poor people are more inclined to accept low
wages and hard jobs. This finding, which is largely consistent with common
sense and everyday experience, helps to increase our confidence that the
proposed approach to unemployment is viable and potentially fruitful.
Extensions might include that of making the degree of impatience endoge-
nous or of explicitly considering opportunity costs in the workers’ decisions.
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As an example, it is often wondered why the unemployed do not move to
other cities to find a job. A likely explanation is that workers might face
opportunity costs in moving, for instance because in their city they already
own a house and the wage they might earn in another city could not be high
enough to buy a new house. Again, workers could have fixed costs to pay
every month, or minimum consumption levels to attain; if labor demand is
inelastic and the wage they could earn is not sufficient to meet their needs,
then they may keep on asking high wages. Moreover, this can also provide a
rationale for why individuals may eventually exit the labor force.
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